Which level of assurance is needed for LSP and other patient portals?

2013/09/09

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More and more health providers offer patient portals. These portals can contribute more efficient and effective health care. In addition, because since they provide easy access to personal health records and personalized health information, they can contribute to more patient empowerment. But there is also a risk: the wrong person (i.e., an identity thief) may get access to this very personal information.

Novay participated in a working group that developed a guide for health providers to help them determine how secure the authentication solution for patient portals should be, i.e., which levels of assurance is needed. My colleague Mettina Veenstra and myself tried out this new guide on the Dutch national infrastructure for the exchange of personal health records. This infrastructure is in Dutch called Landelijk Schakelpunt (LSP), which I have no idea how to translated in English (it resembles what the EU epSOS project calls a National Contact Point). The LSP recently added the possibility for patients to see which health professionals used the LSP to access their health records. It does not provide access for patients to the actual health records. Nevertheless, if an identity thief can see that e.g. an oncologist accessed your medication record as stored by your local pharmacy, then it implies something you may not want to share. The blog post discusses this, including the relationship to the national identity solution in the Netherlands (DigiD which is STORK 2, and lack of STORK 3 solution in the Netherlands).

The full blog post is only in Dutch, see here and copied below for convenience. For non-Dutch speakers, this is what Google translate makes of it.

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